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How viruses are related, and how they have evolved and spread over time, can be 15 
investigated using phylogenetics. Here, we set out how genomic analyses should be used 16 
during an epidemic and propose that phylogenetic insights from the early stages of an 17 
outbreak should heed all the available epidemiological information. 18 
A goal of genomic epidemiology is to infer epidemiological and emergence dynamics 19 
from virus genome sequences obtained over short epidemic timescales 1. Rapid in situ 20 
sequence generation and phylogenetic inference is based on detection of genetic changes in 21 
pathogen sequences. But during outbreaks there are many unknowns. The outbreak of 22 
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), which originated in Wuhan, China, was reported in 23 
December 2019 2. By January 2020, the genome of the causative novel coronavirus, named 24 
SARS-CoV-2, had been sequenced and made publicly available 2. Virus sequences have 25 
underpinned development of diagnostics and vaccines and been used to assess patterns of 26 
transmission and spread. Although sequence data was used to answer crucial epidemiological 27 
questions during the Ebola and Zika outbreaks 3,4, the pace of generation of SARS CoV-2 28 
genome data generation is unprecedented and is informing public health policy in real-time.  29 
Importantly, it’s not only sequences that inform phylogenies, and multiple factors 30 
contribute to the outputs including model assumptions, sampling density, timing of sample 31 
collection, portion of the viral genome sequenced, quality of sequencing data and the 32 
mutation rate of the virus itself. Although it is important to extract as much information as 33 
possible from sequence data as outbreaks unfold, it is imperative to bear in mind that the 34 
historical relationships of strains (phylogenies) are hypotheses that can be challenged as more 35 
data becomes available. Here, we highlight some of the challenges of genomic epidemiology 36 
during outbreaks such as SARS-CoV-2 and advise that interpretation of findings from 37 
phylogenies needs to assess all epidemiological and supporting information and consider 38 
sources of bias. 39 
During outbreaks we want to know if cases are linked and if this implies transmission. 40 
Most viruses can be separated into strains and if two infections are caused by dissimilar 41 
strains one can rule out transmission. The oft-forgotten point is that phylogenies can rule out 42 
transmission, but if infections are caused by the same strains or identical viruses it does not 43 
decisively prove transmission. During an emerging outbreak, when pathogens have not yet 44 
diverged into different strains, phylogenetic information is too weak to hypothesize 45 
transmission linkage─which in turn can be used for geographic inference; even if the 46 
phylogenetic information is stronger, the same phylogeny is consistent with multiple 47 
transmission histories and there may missing links due to incomplete sampling 5. 48 
Consequently, we need to combine phylogenetic findings with epidemiological and 49 
supporting information such as environmental factors and human air travel data before we 50 
draw any immediate conclusions regarding transmission. This was the case with Zika virus in 51 
Africa where epidemiological, human mobility and climatic data supported the phylogenetic 52 
hypothesis that the outbreak was likely imported from Brazil 6. 53 
In the first stage of an outbreak, we can use phylogenetics to discern possible zoonotic 54 
sources, as in the case of the 2018 Lassa fever virus outbreak, where phylogenetic patterns 55 
indicated independent spillover events from rodent hosts 7. The crucial observation was that 56 
the correct identification of the source of zoonotic transmission relies on the availability of 57 
viral genome sequences from potential animal reservoirs. If the source of any virus has not 58 
been sampled, it cannot be inferred, because phylogenetic linkage alone does not prove it. 59 
This is the reason for uncertainty surrounding the zoonotic source of SARS-CoV-2, because 60 
we have limited knowledge about the viral abundance from potential animal reservoirs 8. The 61 
generation of additional viral genome sequences from an outbreak, coupled with virus-62 
specific and epidemiological knowledge, provides insight into whether or not multiple 63 
‘jumps’ occurred from a reservoir that might warrant appropriate control measures. Identical 64 
or nearly-identical virus genomes are expected from early transmission chains if a single 65 
spillover occurred recently, unless multiple zoonoses originated from the same low-genetic 66 
diversity virus pool. In contrast, higher diversity in the early-stage of human-to-human 67 
transmission is expected if multiple zoonoses have occurred or if there is significant within-68 
host evolution 9.  69 
Geographical inferences (where and when) are feasible as more representative viral 70 
genome data─in temporal and spatial scales─becomes available. We can hypothesize the 71 
location of common ancestors using ancestral reconstruction methods and infer phylogenies 72 
scaled to time, in order to date epidemiological events. Such analyses require a molecular 73 
clock, which models how the rate with which mutations accumulate with time, and how this 74 
varies across the branches of a phylogeny. However, early in an outbreak there may not be 75 
sufficient signal to accurately estimate clock rate. If this is the case, then it might be 76 
appropriate to apply an estimate from another closely related virus 10. If temporal signal is 77 
present and a clock rate can be estimated, results need to be reported as credible intervals 78 
(instead of point estimates) to account for uncertainty in both the data (incomplete, biased, or 79 
improper sampling can lead to misleading phylogenies) and the many aspects of the methods. 80 
When investigating the dissemination of an emerging virus the number of sequenced 81 
viral genomes may not be representative. Even as the outbreak unfolds, and more genomes 82 
are obtained, they only represent a snapshot of the underlying genetic diversity. If 83 
phylogenies are considered alone we cannot conclusively assert the geographical origins of 84 
the virus─or the extent of community transmission─as we cannot distinguish between local 85 
transmission events and multiple introductions of genetically similar viruses, from 86 
geographically distinct sources, if one of them has not been sampled. In this way uneven 87 
sampling can also lead to misleading conclusions on the geographical source, number of 88 
introductions and the size and duration of local transmission chains 11. The significance of 89 
these associations is harder to ascertain when the phylogeny is reported without any 90 
assessment on the reliability of internal branches. Therefore, phylogenetic interpretation from 91 
ongoing outbreaks as is the case of SARS-CoV-2 needs to be done in the context of all 92 
available information such as temporal and spatial distribution of cases, travel patterns and 93 
any evidence of epidemiological linkage, sampling uncertainty and other sources of bias need 94 
to be carefully considered and reported.  95 
The methods for valid phylogenetic inference require multiple assumptions which are 96 
likely not met during emerging outbreaks. Examples (not exhaustive) include adequate 97 
phylogenetic signal, which is low when strains have not yet diverged; geographical 98 
representation and effective sampling time points with sufficient molecular clock signal, 99 
which only become feasible as the epidemic unfolds; and random mixing, which may be 100 
violated under certain circumstances, for instance when mitigation strategies are set in place. 101 
Estimates from phylogenies may be sensitive to one or more of these assumptions and 102 
conclusions need to be made and shared with caution. Another essential consideration during 103 
an epidemic is accurate rooting of the phylogeny as it determines the direction of 104 
transmission over time 12.  105 
There are also genome features that are intrinsic to the biology of the virus that may 106 
impact the extent and applicability of phylogenetics during outbreaks. For instance, the 107 
presence of recombination/reassortment and low diversity (due to the rate of evolution, 108 
selective constraints and transmission bottlenecks) complicate the resolution of phylogenetic 109 
relationships, but the incorporation of within-host viral diversity may provide greater 110 
resolution in understanding transmission dynamics 13. Moreover, some of mutations in the 111 
viral genome sequence can be due to the error rate of the sequencing technology, recurrent 112 
sequencing issues, hypermutability or contamination which warrant caution with 113 
interpretations and especially with those concerning selection and recombination.  114 
Genomic epidemiology has supported public health outbreak responses. Indeed, the 115 
ability to exploit viral genome sequences has allowed us to characterise early patterns of 116 
SARS-CoV-2 transmission in China, New Zealand and Australia 14,15. In the midst of an 117 
outbreak sharing data is both necessary and important for an effective response, but sharing 118 
the associated metadata is also necessary to aid interpretations (e.g. how representative is the 119 
data of the country-wide situation) and to avoid creating sampling bias by researchers that are 120 
not doing the sequencing themselves.  121 
The emergence of SARS-CoV-2 has presented a series of challenges about how we 122 
reliably extract information from phylogenies to gain insights into virus transmission and 123 
spread, and how we responsibly present our findings. Owing to low genetic diversity and 124 
uneven sampling, several controversial hypotheses have already been put forward. One 125 
cautionary tale involves how an outbreak in Bavaria seeded the epidemic in northern Italy 126 
and the subsequent wider outbreak in Europe. This notion was based on a small sample of 127 
very similar sequences. However, it overlooked a more likely scenario in which this virus 128 
was already circulating in China and that European regions had multiple introductions from 129 
China. At this early stage conclusions about the impacts of mutations on transmission and 130 
disease (e.g. D614G mutation in the spike protein 16) should not be made on the basis of 131 
phylogenies alone but with separate evidence supporting not only a phenotypic difference but 132 
the resulting consequences for epidemiology. 133 
The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has highlighted the importance of providing a 134 
comprehensive rationale for any conclusions about the spatio-temporal dispersal of the virus. 135 
Phylogenies represent hypotheses that encompass different sources of error and this 136 
uncertainty needs to be visualised and communicated far more transparently. Another 137 
challenge is how we facilitate the dissemination of metadata and integrate this with 138 
phylogenetic trees. Incorporating host characteristics (e.g. age, onset date, exposure history) 139 
to aid phylogenetic interpretation would undoubtedly results in more reliable inferences.  140 
Now, more than ever, careful reporting of phylogenetic interpretations, while 141 
safeguarding the privacy of infected individuals, would ensure that both policymakers and the 142 
public have the best possible information during an outbreak. Failure to balance these issues 143 
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